Review of Nigel Hey, \u3cem\u3eThe Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense\u3c/em\u3e by Hafemeister, David W.
Book Reviews
Book Reviews 
Nigel Hey, The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile 
Defense. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. 275 pp. $27.95. 
Reviewed by David Hafemeister, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stan­
ford University 
Nigel Hey’s book, The Star Wars Enigma, is a diplomatic/political history of President 
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The book belongs on the shelf 
with Francis Fitzgerald’s Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of 
the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000) and William Broad’s Star War­
riors: A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the Young Scientists behind Our Space-Age 
Weaponry (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985). The Star Wars Enigma avoids tech­
nical analysis of SDI beyond stating the consensus view that SDI was made up of a se­
ries of difªcult tasks that were well beyond the technology of the time. A puzzling 
question thus arises when Hey describes the political and diplomatic impact of SDI 
on the Soviet Union. Why did Mikhail Gorbachev remain so concerned about SDI 
even after he received advice from Roald Sagdeev (the director of the Soviet Space In­
stitute) and Evgenii Velikhov (the vice president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
and deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute) that SDI was modern-day Lysenkoism 
(p. 133)? I will return to this issue shortly. 
Most scientists and engineers who examined the SDI technologies came to the 
conclusion that SDI was several orders of magnitude away from being a viable system. 
The daunting obstacles to SDI’s success can be seen by asking a question: Would an 
X-ray laser based on a pop-up missile launched from a U.S. submarine in the south­
ernmost Artic Ocean have had sufªcient time to destroy a missile launched 3,000 ki­
lometers away in Kazakhstan? Not enough time would have been available to destroy 
the Soviet missile in its boost phase. Closer missiles could have used fast-burn boosters 
to survive, if indeed the X-ray laser ever would have worked in the ªrst place. Beyond 
these complications, SDI was further compromised by the extreme difªculty of ob­
taining adequate battle-management information for thousands of directed-energy 
weapons (DEW) mobilized against a massive nuclear attack. This pessimism was fur­
ther compounded by the relative ease of offensive countermeasures to foil SDI. Hey 
describes the technical reservations of Gerald Yonas, who spearheaded the ªrst techni­
cal programs when he was the SDI Organization’s deputy director and chief science 
adviser from 1984 to 1986. Hey discusses the reports put out by the Ofªce of Tech­
nology Assessment and the National Academy of Sciences back-channel communica­
tions with Soviet scientists, but he fails to mention the best technical analysis of SDI, 
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which was carried out by the American Physical Society (APS). The APS DEW panel 
of seventeen scientists had a strong contingent of insiders, four from government 
weapons laboratories and three from industrial laboratories. These insiders were well-
versed in the government’s SDI research. After the APS report went through 
declassiªcation in 1987, the presidential Ofªce of Science and Technology Policy 
(OSTP), acting for the Executive Branch, refused to allow the APS to present its re­
sults. The government denied itself the best study on SDI because APS identiªed the 
physical limitations of SDI. While working in the State Department’s Ofªce of Strate­
gic Nuclear Policy at the time, I was contacted by the APS to arrange a brieªng for the 
report at the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
OSTP tried twice to cancel the brieªng, but my State Department boss would not 
allow this to happen. He encouraged me to hold the brieªng as long as nothing about 
it was disclosed to the press. Twenty years later it seems reasonable to recount this epi­
sode in the Journal of Cold War Studies. 
In 1987, the SDIO abruptly shifted from DEW to hit-to-kill weapons using 
kinetic-kill vehicles. Hey does not adequately explain the speciªc reasons for this ma­
jor change other than quoting Yonas’s 1986 speech: “The most straightforward and 
best–proven approach to interception of a high-velocity object in space is with a very 
smart homing projectile” (p. 187). The broader lesson is that our government institu­
tions did not competently examine the science and technology. Why did the Defense 
Department’s own Defense Science Board fail to point out SDI’s deªciencies? 
This brings us back to the question raised earlier: Why did Gorbachev try so hard 
to kill SDI? In answering the question we need to bear in mind that scientists debate 
facts, whereas politicians often prefer to debate perceptions. Roald Sagdeev com­
ments: “I think the moment Gorbachev understood that SDI wouldn’t work, he de­
cided that those who were trying to push a futile system must have some kind of hid­
den agenda. Even some military spokesmen thought . . .  [the United States was] 
planning to use the cover of SDI to deliver nuclear weapons from orbit” (p. 147). 
Much has been made of the agreement that Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev nearly 
signed at Reykjavik in October 1986 to eliminate all nuclear weapons. (Whether the 
Pentagon and Congress would have concurred is doubtful.) The proposal to do away 
with nuclear weapons failed because Reagan did not agree to Gorbachev’s last-minute 
request for a ban on SDI testing in outer space. Both Reagan and Gorbachev were sad­
dened by their failure to conclude the weapons ban, but over the next few years the 
two countries achieved several important agreements, including the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, 
and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). So, did SDI shorten the Cold 
War? Gorbachev responds: “I cannot agree that the SDI initiative had this much im­
portance” (p. 219). Velikhov comments: “The idea that it [SDI] accelerated the col­
lapse of the Soviet Union is nonsense.” Sagdeev concurs: “The reasons were com­
pletely internal.” Sagdeev is aware that “many in the West were persuaded that SDI 
intimidated the Soviets so much that they decided to dismantle the communist sys­
tem,” but he dismisses this notion as ridiculous and “a kind of historic injustice.” Even 
the late Edward Teller, one of the most ardent proponents of SDI, acknowledged that 
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SDI was not what brought the Cold War to an end: “The obvious reasons for the fail-
ure . . . were,  ªrst, misgovernment, and second, failure to acquire military superiority 
beyond Eastern Europe.” 
A similar point was made in May 1992 by then-Central Intelligence Agency 
Director Robert Gates when, in response to complaints by Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, he conceded in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association that the U.S. 
government was surprised by the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union. Senator 
Moynihan then described his own predictions published in 1979 that the USSR 
would eventually collapse because of its poor economy and the West only needed to 
wait. Former Secretary of State George Shultz later concurred: “I think we won the 
Cold War because their system was essentially a bankrupt system” (p. 233). Reagan’s 
buildup of strategic offensive weapons affected the USSR because of the increased 
risks of inadvertent nuclear war, not because either side could ever win a nuclear war. 
The impact of SDI on Gorbachev was much less than that of economics and nuclear 
instability. SDI could have shortened or extended the Cold War by at most six 
months. 
What actually happened six months after Reykjavik is that the United States 
abandoned DEW in favor of kinetic-kill vehicles. By that point SDI was becoming ir­
relevant and did not prevent the Soviet Union from soon accepting INF, CFE and 
START. One could even argue that SDI slowed the end of the Cold War by prevent­
ing major agreements at Reykjavik. One could also argue that the extra push from 
SDI on top of Gorbachev’s other problems made him more compliant, not out of fear 
but out of system-overload. Either way, though, the effect was not large. Hey does not 
discuss the possibility that SDI extended the Cold war and concludes: “There is no 
way of measuring how much SDI contributed to the Soviet Union’s fall” (p. 227). The 
Star Wars Enigma is a balanced, well-researched, and well-written treatment of SDI by 
a government laboratory insider, a ªtting volume to read alongside Way Out There in 
the Blue. 
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